Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 53

Number 3

Article 3

Spring 5-1-2020

The Copyright Act’s Mandatory-Deposit Requirement:
Unnecessary and Unconstitutional
Drew Thornley
Stephen F. Austin State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Drew Thornley, The Copyright Act’s Mandatory-Deposit Requirement: Unnecessary and Unconstitutional ,
53 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 645 (2020).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

(8) 53.3_THORNLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

7/7/2020 10:52 PM

THE COPYRIGHT ACT’S MANDATORYDEPOSIT REQUIREMENT: UNNECESSARY
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Drew Thornley*
Many people are unaware of a federal copyright statute that
requires owners of material published in the United States to furnish the
federal government with two copies of each item published. Section
407(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 (17 U.S.C. § 407) states that “the
owner of copyright or of the exclusive right of publication in a work
published in the United States shall deposit, within three months after the
date of such publication—(1) two complete copies of the best edition; or
(2) if the work is a sound recording, two complete phonorecords of the
best edition, together with any printed or other visually perceptible
material published with such phonorecords.” A recent lawsuit highlights
constitutional problems with this statutory provision and the undue
burdens it can place on publishers.
Valancourt has published more than 400 books and adds about
twenty new titles yearly; but unlike traditional publishers, Valancourt
does not keep copies in stock. Rather, it employs a print-on-demand
model, wherein “James edits each book and lays out galleys, but nothing
is physically printed until a customer or retailer actually orders a book.”
Not keeping books in stock proved problematic when Valancourt
received an email on June 11, 2018, from the United States Copyright
Office, stating that Valancourt was not complying with the mandatorydeposit requirement and that if he did not comply, he could face large
fines. After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the matter, Valancourt
filed a lawsuit in federal court, challenging the constitutionality of
section 407, in light of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the
First Amendment’s protections of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press.
This Article argues that the mandatory-deposit requirement is
unnecessary and, on at least three grounds, unconstitutional.

* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Stephen F. Austin State University; J.D., Harvard
Law School; B.A., The University of Alabama.

645

(8) 53.3_THORNLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

7/7/2020 10:52 PM

646

[Vol. 53:645

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 647
II. SECTION 407 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT ....................................... 647
III. VALANCOURT BOOKS ............................................................... 653
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST SECTION 407’S MANDATORYDEPOSIT REQUIREMENT ........................................................ 656
A. Unnecessary .................................................................... 656
B. Unconstitutional .............................................................. 662
1. Fifth Amendment: Takings Clause ........................... 662
2. First Amendment: Freedom of Speech ..................... 667
a. First requirement .................................................. 674
b. Second requirement ............................................. 675
3. Fifth Amendment: Equal Protection via the Due
Process Clause .......................................................... 678
V. CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 683

(8) 53.3_THORNLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

7/7/2020 10:52 PM

2020] THE COPYRIGHT ACT’S MANDATORY-DEPOSIT REQ.

647

I. INTRODUCTION
Many people are unaware of a federal copyright statute that
requires owners of material published in the United States to furnish
the federal government with two copies of each item published.
Section 407(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 states:
[T]he owner of copyright or of the exclusive right of
publication in a work published in the United States shall
deposit, within three months after the date of such
publication—(1) two complete copies of the best edition; or
(2) if the work is a sound recording, two complete
phonorecords of the best edition, together with any printed
or other visually perceptible material published with such
phonorecords.1
A recent lawsuit highlights constitutional problems with this statutory
provision and the undue burdens it can place on publishers. Part II of
this Article highlights the details of section 407. Part III reveals the
story behind the lawsuit. Part IV outlines legal arguments against
section 407.
II. SECTION 407 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Section 407(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”) states
that, subject to certain exceptions discussed below,
the owner of copyright or of the exclusive right of
publication in a work published in the United States shall
deposit, within three months after the date of such
publication—(1) two complete copies of the best edition; or
(2) if the work is a sound recording, two complete
phonorecords of the best edition, together with any printed
or other visually perceptible material published with such
phonorecords.2
This requirement is known as the “mandatory-deposit requirement.”3
A mandatory deposit, which can also be referred to as a “legal

1. 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2012).
2. Id.
3. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES:
CHAPTER 1500 66, https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/chap1500/ch1500-deposits.pdf (Sept. 29,
2017).
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deposit,”4 is made to “the Copyright Office for the use or disposition
of the Library of Congress”5 but is not required in order to receive
copyright protection.6 The United States Copyright Office’s
Copyright Acquisitions Division administers the Act’s mandatorydeposit requirements.7
This Article focuses on the non-sound-recording deposit
requirement that “two complete copies of the best edition”8 must be
submitted to the United States Copyright Office. Per the clear
language of the statute, it is not sufficient to submit any two copies of
a work. Rather, two “complete” copies of the “best” edition of a work
must be deposited.9 A “complete” copy “includes all elements
comprising the unit of publication of the best edition of the work,
including elements that, if considered separately, would not be
copyrightable subject matter or would otherwise be exempt from
mandatory deposit requirements under paragraph (c) of this section.”10
The “best” edition is “the edition, published in the United States at any
time before the date of deposit, that the Library of Congress
determines to be most suitable for its purposes.”11
4. Id. at 1.
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 407(b) (2012).
6. See id. § 407(a). The deposit requirements of section 407 are distinct from the deposit
requirements of section 408, which concerns copyright registration. Regarding copyright deposit,
see 37 C.F.R. § 202.20 (2019).
7. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES:
CHAPTER 100 1 https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/redlines/chap100.pdf (Sept. 29, 2017).
8. Id.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2012).
10. 37 C.F.R. § 202.19 (2018).
11. Id. § 202.19(b)(1)(i). Appendix B to 37 C.F.R. § 202 describes the “best edition”
requirement in more detail, stating,
The criteria to be applied in determining the best edition of each of several
types of material are listed below in descending order of importance. In
deciding between two editions, a criterion-by-criterion comparison should be
made. The edition which first fails to satisfy a criterion is to be considered of
inferior quality and will not be an acceptable deposit. Example: If a
comparison is made between two hardbound editions of a book, one a trade
edition printed on acid-free paper, and the other a specially bound edition
printed on average paper, the former will be the best edition because the type
of paper is a more important criterion than the binding.
37 C.F.R. § 202, Appendix B (2019). The criteria for “printed textual matter” are as follows:
A. Paper, Binding, and Packaging: 1. Archival-quality rather than lesspermanent paper. 2. Hard cover rather than soft cover. 3. Library binding
rather than commercial binding. 4. Trade edition rather than book club edition.
5. Sewn rather than glue-only binding. 6. Sewn or glued rather than stapled or
spiral-bound. 7. Stapled rather than spiral-bound or plastic-bound. 8. Bound
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The Act gives the Register of Copyrights the authority to exempt
certain works from the deposit requirement,12 and a party may request
rather than looseleaf, except when future looseleaf insertions are to be issued.
In the case of looseleaf materials, this includes the submission of all binders
and indexes when they are part of the unit as published and offered for sale or
distribution. Additionally, the regular and timely receipt of all appropriate
looseleaf updates, supplements, and releases including supplemental binders
issued to handle these expanded versions, is part of the requirement to
properly maintain these publications. 9. Slip-cased rather than nonslip-cased.
10. With protective folders rather than without (for broadsides). 11. Rolled
rather than folded (for broadsides). 12. With protective coatings rather than
without (except broadsides, which should not be coated). B. Rarity: 1. Special
limited edition having the greatest number of special features. 2. Other limited
edition rather than trade edition. 3. Special binding rather than trade binding.
C. Illustrations: 1. Illustrated rather than unillustrated. 2. Illustrations in color
rather than black and white. D. Special Features: 1. With thumb notches or
index tabs rather than without. 2. With aids to use such as overlays and
magnifiers rather than without. E. Size: 1. Larger rather than smaller sizes.
(Except that large-type editions for the partially-sighted are not required in
place of editions employing type of more conventional size.).
37 C.F.R. § 202, Appendix B (2019). A party may request “special relief” from the “best edition”
requirement. See 37 C.F.R. § 202, Appendix B (2019) (“Under regulations of the Copyright Office,
potential depositors may request authorization to deposit copies or phonorecords of other than the
best edition of a specific work (e.g., a microform rather than a printed edition of a serial), by
requesting ‘special relief’ from the deposit requirements. All requests for special relief should be
in writing and should state the reason(s) why the applicant cannot send the required deposit and
what the applicant wishes to submit instead of the required deposit.”).
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 407(c) (2012) (“The Register of Copyrights may by regulation exempt
any categories of material from the deposit requirements of this section, or require deposit of only
one copy or phonorecord with respect to any categories. Such regulations shall provide either for
complete exemption from the deposit requirements of this section, or for alternative forms of
deposit aimed at providing a satisfactory archival record of a work without imposing practical or
financial hardships on the depositor, where the individual author is the owner of copyright in a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work and (i) less than five copies of the work have been published,
or (ii) the work has been published in a limited edition consisting of numbered copies, the monetary
value of which would make the mandatory deposit of two copies of the best edition of the work
burdensome, unfair, or unreasonable.”). 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c) lists twelve categories of works that
are exempt from subsection (a)’s mandatory-deposit requirements. 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c) (2018)
(“(c) Exemptions from deposit requirements. The following categories of material are exempt from
the deposit requirements of section 407(a) of title 17: (1) Diagrams and models illustrating scientific
or technical works or formulating scientific or technical information in linear or three-dimensional
form, such as an architectural or engineering blueprint, plan, or design, a mechanical drawing, or
an anatomical model. (2) Greeting cards, picture postcards, and stationery. (3) Lectures, sermons,
speeches, and addresses when published individually and not as a collection of the works of one or
more authors. (4) Literary, dramatic, and musical works published only as embodied in
phonorecords. This category does not exempt the owner of copyright, or of the exclusive right of
publication, in a sound recording resulting from the fixation of such works in a phonorecord from
the applicable deposit requirements for the sound recording. (5) Electronic works published in the
United States and available only online. This exemption includes electronic serials available only
online only until such time as a demand is issued by the Copyright Office under the regulations set
forth in § 202.24. This exemption does not apply to works that are published in both online,
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“special relief” from the mandatory-deposit requirement to be granted
at the discretion of the Register of Copyrights.13 Non-compliance with
the deposit requirement can lead to a range of financial penalties.14
electronic formats and in physical formats, which remain subject to the appropriate mandatory
deposit requirements. (6) Three-dimensional sculptural works, and any works published only as
reproduced in or on jewelry, dolls, toys, games, plaques, floor coverings, wallpaper and similar
commercial wall coverings, textiles and other fabrics, packaging material, or any useful article.
Globes, relief models, and similar cartographic representations of area are not within this category
and are subject to the applicable deposit requirements. (7) Prints, labels, and other advertising
matter, including catalogs, published in connection with the rental lease, lending, licensing, or sale
of articles of merchandise, works of authorship, or services. (8) Tests, and answer material for tests
when published separately from other literary works. (9) Works first published as individual
contributions to collective works. This category does not exempt the owner of copyright, or of the
exclusive right of publication, in the collective work as a whole, from the applicable deposit
requirements for the collective work. (10) Works first published outside the United States and later
published in the United States without change in copyrightable content, if: (i) Registration for the
work was made under 17 U.S.C. 408 before the work was published in the United States; or (ii)
Registration for the work was made under 17 U.S.C. 408 after the work was published in the United
States but before a demand for deposit is made under 17 U.S.C. 407(d). (11) Works published only
as embodied in a soundtrack that is an integral part of a motion picture. This category does not
exempt the owner of copyright, or of the exclusive right of publication, in the motion picture, from
the applicable deposit requirements for the motion picture. (12) Motion pictures that consist of
television transmission programs and that have been published, if at all, only by reason of a license
or other grant to a nonprofit institution of the right to make a fixation of such programs directly
from a transmission to the public, with or without the right to make further uses of such fixations.”).
13. See 37 C.F.R § 202.19(e) (2018) (“(e) Special relief. (1) In the case of any published work
not exempt from deposit under paragraph (c) of this section, the Register of Copyrights may, after
consultation with other appropriate officials of the Library of Congress and upon such conditions
as the Register may determine after such consultation: (i) Grant an exemption from the deposit
requirements of section 407(a) of title 17 on an individual basis for single works or series or groups
of works; or (ii) Permit the deposit of one copy or phonorecord, or alternative identifying material,
in lieu of the two copies or phonorecords required by paragraph (d)(1) of this section; or (iii) Permit
the deposit of incomplete copies or phonorecords, or copies or phonorecords other than those
normally comprising the best edition; or (iv) Permit the deposit of identifying material which does
not comply with § 202.21 of these regulations. (2) Any decision as to whether to grant such special
relief, and the conditions under which special relief is to be granted, shall be made by the Register
of Copyrights after consultation with other appropriate officials of the Library of Congress, and
shall be based upon the acquisition policies of the Library of Congress then in force. (3) Requests
for special relief under this paragraph shall be made in writing to the Chief, Examining Division,
shall be signed by or on behalf of the owner of copyright or of the exclusive right of publication in
the work, and shall set forth specific reasons why the request should be granted. (4) The Register
of Copyrights may, after consultation with other appropriate officials of the Library of Congress,
terminate any ongoing or continuous grant of special relief. Notice of termination shall be given in
writing and shall be sent to the individual person or organization to whom the grant of special relief
had been given, at the last address shown in the records of the Copyright Office. A notice of
termination may be given at any time, but it shall state a specific date of termination that is at least
30 days later than the date the notice is mailed. Termination shall not affect the validity of any
deposit made earlier under the grant of special relief.”).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 407(d) (2012) (“At any time after publication of a work as provided by
subsection (a), the Register of Copyrights may make written demand for the required deposit on
any of the persons obligated to make the deposit under subsection (a). Unless deposit is made within
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Parts of section 407’s house report15 are worth noting. For
starters, it comments on the distinction between the mandatory-deposit
requirement and copyright registration, stating,
Under the 1909 statute, deposit of copies for the collections
of the Library of Congress and deposit of copies for purposes
of copyright registration have been treated as the same thing.
The bill’s basic approach is to regard deposit and registration
as separate though closely related: deposit of copies or
phonorecords for the Library of Congress is mandatory, but
exceptions can be made for material the Library neither
needs nor wants; copyright registration is not generally
mandatory, but is a condition of certain remedies for
copyright infringement. Deposit for the Library of Congress
can be, and in the bulk of cases undoubtedly will be,
combined with copyright registration.16
Secondly, works first published abroad and subsequently published in
the United States are (with exception17) subject to the deposit
requirement:
Although the basic deposit requirements are limited to works
“published with notice of copyright in the United States,”
they would become applicable as soon as a work first
published abroad is published in this country through the
distribution of copies or phonorecords that are either
imported or are part of an American edition.18
three months after the demand is received, the person or persons on whom the demand was made
are liable—(1) to a fine of not more than $250 for each work; and (2) to pay into a specially
designated fund in the Library of Congress the total retail price of the copies or phonorecords
demanded, or, if no retail price has been fixed, the reasonable cost to the Library of Congress of
acquiring them; and (3) to pay a fine of $2,500, in addition to any fine or liability imposed under
clauses (1) and (2), if such person willfully or repeatedly fails or refuses to comply with such a
demand.”).
15. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976) (Conf. Rep.).
16. Id. at 150.
17. 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c)(10) (2018).
18. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 151 (1976) (Conf. Rep.). Likewise, the mandatory-deposit
requirement applies to a work that is published simultaneously in the United States and another
country. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 3, at 69 (“The mandatory deposit requirement only
applies to works published in the United States. Unpublished works and works that are published
solely outside the United States are not subject to this requirement. Mandatory deposit does apply
to works that are published simultaneously in both a foreign country and in the United States. It
applies to works that are first published in a foreign country and then subsequently published or
distributed in this country.”).
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Finally, the house report remarks on possible exemptions from the
deposit requirement and its flexibility in balancing the needs of the
Library of Congress versus the burdens of the deposit requirement on
the owners of published works, stating that
the fundamental criteria governing regulations issued under
section 407(c), which allows exemptions from the deposit
requirements for certain categories of works, would be the
needs and wants of the Library. The purpose of this provision
is to make the deposit requirements as flexible as possible,
so that there will be no obligation to make deposits where it
serves no purpose, so that only one copy or phonorecord may
be deposited where two are not needed, and so that
reasonable adjustments can be made to meet practical needs
in special cases. The regulations, in establishing special
categories for these purposes, would necessarily balance the
value of the copies or phonorecords to the collections of the
Library of Congress against the burdens and costs to the
copyright owner of providing them.19
Originally, per the Copyright Act of 1790,20 the nation’s first
federal copyright law, depositing pre-publication copies of works with
the federal government was required for copyright registration.21 The
United States Copyright Office explains,
In May 1790, when Congress enacted the first federal
copyright law, the U.S. Copyright Office did not yet exist.
Instead, authors and publishers recorded their claims with
federal district courts and submitted copies of their works (in
those days, book [sic], maps, and charts) in support of their
applications. These works, known as deposits, were stored
in a variety of places, including in the U.S. Department of
State and the U.S. Department of the Interior.22
In addition, post-publication deposits to the United States Secretary of
State were required within six months after publication.23 This system
remained until the second general revision of the Copyright Act in July

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 151 (1976) (Conf. Rep.).
Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 125.
See Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Cong. ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 125.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE supra note 7, at 1.
Copyright Act of 1790, 1. Cong. ch. 15, § 4, 1 Stat. 125, 125.
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1870, which centralized the copyright system in the Library of
Congress, which became the lone repository for deposits.24 The United
States Copyright Office writes, “No legislation was more important to
the development of the Library than that law, which required all
authors to deposit in the Library two copies of every book, pamphlet,
map, print, and piece of music registered in the United States.”25 In
February 1897, Congress established the United States Copyright
Office, which, among other functions, administers the mandatorydeposit requirement.26
III. VALANCOURT BOOKS
Valancourt Books (“Valancourt”) is “an independent small press
specializing in the rediscovery of rare, neglected, and out-of-print
fiction,” including “[g]othic, horror, and supernatural fiction” and
LGBT-interest titles.27 Since “far too many great books remain out-ofprint and inaccessible,” in 2005, James Jenkins founded Valancourt
“to restore many of these works to new generations of readers.”28
Jenkins and his husband, Ryan Cagle, run Valancourt out of their
house in Richmond, Virginia, with no employees.29
Valancourt has published more than 400 books and adds about
twenty new titles yearly;30 but unlike traditional publishers,
Valancourt does not keep copies in stock.31 Rather, it employs a printon-demand model, wherein “James edits each book and lays out
galleys, but nothing is physically printed until a customer or retailer
actually orders a book.”32 Not keeping books in stock proved
24. United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. Our History, VALANCOURT BOOKS, http://www.valancourtbooks.com/our-history.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
28. Id.
29. Nick Sibilla, Why Is the Federal Government Threatening an Indie Book Publisher with
$100,000 in Fines?, FORBES (Aug. 30 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/
2018/08/30/why-is-the-federal-government-threatening-an-indie-book-publisher-with-100000-infines/#737e28691335.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Virginia Books: Outdated Federal Law Threatens Unique Richmond Publisher, INST. FOR
JUST., https://ij.org/case/virginia-books/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). The couple has painstakingly
typed out manuscripts from microfiches and rare print editions (including from the only surviving
copy for some books) and converted them to digital formats. So when a customer orders a book,
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problematic when Valancourt received an email on June 11, 2018,
from the United States Copyright Office, stating that Valancourt was
not complying with the mandatory-deposit requirement and that if he
did not comply, he could face large fines.33 The Institute for Justice
(IJ) writes,
To comply with the government’s demand, James would
have to go online, order every single book from Valancourt’s
back catalog, and then physically package each one up to
ship to the Copyright Office. (The government’s demand
letter contained 341 individual notices that, for tracking
purposes, had to be included with each individual book
James was supposed to send.) The process would have taken
days and cost thousands of dollars.34
Valancourt will send the digital files to a printing vendor, who then prints a single-bound volume.
“This way, the books stay in print indefinitely,” Jenkins explained. Sibilla, supra note 29.
33. Virginia Books Outdated Federal Law Threatens Unique Richmond Publisher, supra note
32; see 17 U.S.C. § 407 (2012). Writes Nick Sibilla,
Failure to comply could result in fines of up to $250 per book, plus the book’s
retail price. The government could further fine Valancourt up to $2,500 for
“willfully or repeatedly” failing to comply with the deposit demand. (It’s
unclear whether or not the ‘willful’ fine could apply just once to Valancourt’s
case or if it could apply to each individual book.) Fines could quickly reach
six figures. “Sending hundreds of our books to the government will cost us
thousands of dollars and many hours of time, which cuts into our already
limited resources for our mission to rescue rare and important literature,”
Jenkins said. “But if we don’t send the books, the Copyright Office says they
will fine us out of existence.”
Sibilla, supra note 29.
34. Virginia Books Outdated Federal Law Threatens Unique Richmond Publisher, supra note
32. According to IJ, “the only way that Valancourt can obtain copies of its works is by ordering
them from the printer through its own online retail portal.” Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 11, Valancourt Books, LLC v. Claggett, No. 1:18-cv-01922 (D. D.C. Aug. 16,
2018).
Moreover, Valancourt is actively expanding its catalog every year. Valancourt
intends to continue publishing multiple books per year, but it does not want
to send copies of each new work to the Copyright Office. Jenkins’ past
experience participating voluntarily in the Cataloging-in-Publication program
gives him direct knowledge that sending a copy of every single new title to
the federal government is both expensive and time-consuming. Complying
with the mandatory-deposit requirement on a forward-looking basis would
result in at least hundreds of dollars in additional annual costs to Valancourt
in addition to many hours of time diverted from its two-person staff’s already
limited resources.
Id. at 13. IJ writes,
To make matters worse, James had already given many of these books to the
federal government. When Valancourt first started publishing, it participated
in the Library of Congress’s “Cataloging in Publication” program, in which
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On June 12, 2018, Jenkins replied to the Copyright Office’s
email, requesting it withdraw its demand.35 On August 9, 2018, the
Copyright Office replied to Jenkins’s email, attaching a new demand
letter for 240 books (rather than the 341 listed in their initial
demand).36 On August 16, 2018, represented by IJ, Valancourt filed a
lawsuit in federal court, challenging the constitutionality of 17 U.S.C.
§ 407, in light of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the First
Amendment’s protections of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press.37 The complaint states,
Valancourt was unaware that it was legally obligated to
deposit copies of every book it produced with the federal
government until it received a written demand from the
United States Copyright Office that it provide the
government with copies of virtually every book in its
catalog—341 in total—on pain of fines that could extend into
six figures. Valancourt is now faced with an untenable
choice: Comply with the Copyright Office’s demand for its
past publications and deposit copies of each book it publishes
publishers provide the Library with a free copy of a book in exchange for a
Library of Congress catalog number that is meant to facilitate processing for
libraries. After depositing more than 100 books this way, James eventually
decided that providing these copies was too expensive and yielded little
benefit, and so he stopped—but the Copyright Office was demanding that he
give them additional copies of many of those 100 books anyway. James
immediately explained all of this in an email he sent in response to the demand
letter. Two months later, the Copyright Office finally replied—to inform him
that he still needed to provide copies of books that contained any
“copyrightable” material, even if he had already sent them to the Library of
Congress for other reasons. For unexplained reasons, the new letter dropped
the number of books demanded down to 240, but it still threatened crippling
fines and warned Valancourt not to keep publishing books without sending
copies to the federal government.
Virginia Books Outdated Federal Law Threatens Unique Richmond Publisher, supra note 32. Nick
Sibilla writes,
To comply with the government’s demand, each book would have to be
ordered, printed, bound, packed, and shipped individually. Jenkins estimates
that compliance could cost $2,000 to $3,000—a significant sum for a niche
publisher. “That’s a lot of money for a small business and it would take away
from our mission, which is to publish these books,” Jenkins explained. “With
the $2,000 or $3,000, that’s several new titles we could resurrect and bring
back.”
Sibilla, supra note 29.
35. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 34, at 11.
36. Id. at 12.
37. Id. at 1.
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in the future (which would impose substantial burdens in
terms of time and financial cost) or await a lawsuit from the
Copyright Office seeking crippling fines. It therefore brings
this action to clarify its rights and obligations under 17
U.S.C. § 407 and the Constitution of the United States.38
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST SECTION 407’S
MANDATORY-DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT
My chief objections to the mandatory-deposit requirement are
that it is unnecessary and unconstitutional. An examination of each
objection follows.
A. Unnecessary
Historically, there have been two purposes of a mandatorydeposit requirement: “to identify the copyrighted work in connection
with copyright registration, and to provide copies for the use of the
Library of Congress.”39 The former is the original purpose, while the
latter emerged decades afterward.40
The first purpose (“to identify the copyrighted work in connection
with copyright registration”) is no longer applicable and is, thus, a
non-starter. Per the Copyright Act of 1976, registration of a work is no
longer a requirement of copyright protection, which accrues
automatically, whenever the work is created.41 However, the 1976 Act
did not remove the mandatory-deposit requirement. So, the deposit
mandate remained, but its initial reason for being did not. “Simply put,

38. Id. at 2. The Copyright Office’s demand letter to Valancourt instructed Valancourt to ship
each of the 341 books separately, along with a copy of the relevant notice for each book. See id. at
10.
39. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS, 83RD CONG., STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, PREPARED BY
ELIZABETH K. DUNNE (Comm. Print 1960), https://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/
study20.pdf [hereinafter STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS].
40. “From 1790 to 1870 the function of deposit was chiefly to serve as record evidence of the
work covered by the copyright claim . . . From 1870 to 1909, under a completely centralized
registration system at the Library of Congress, the deposit of two copies of each work provided
equally for the maintenance of a copy as record evidence, as in the previous period, and as a means
of enriching the Library.” Id. at 11.
41. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 407(a) (2012).
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the rationale for the book-deposit mandate went away decades ago,”
writes IJ.42
The second purpose (“to provide copies for the use of the Library
of Congress”) remains but is insufficient. The proffered justification
for this purpose is that it is culturally important to make deposits
available to the Library of Congress.43 Perhaps the leading proponent
of this view was Ainsworth Spofford, who served as the nation’s sixth
Librarian of Congress.44 Spofford “envisioned it as the national
library” and “was also convinced of the value of the copyright deposit
to such an institution.”45 Ellen C. Dement writes that, after being
named Librarian of Congress,
Spofford immediately set to work establishing the Library’s
national role, and he pursued this cause with energy and
42. Virginia Books Outdated Federal Law Threatens Unique Richmond Publisher, supra note
32.
43. See STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, supra note 39. “The great value
of the copyright deposit to the collections of the Library of Congress since 1870 has been
recognized many times. In the past it has materially assisted the Library in building its collections
on all aspects of American history, literature, law, music, and social culture.” Id. at 30. “The great
value to the public of supplying copies of published works to a national library has long been
recognized in the United States and in other countries.” Id. at 34.
In 1846 the act establishing the Smithsonian Institution provided that one
copy of each work for which a copyright should be secured under act of
Congress should be delivered to the Librarian of the Smithsonian Institution
and to the Librarian of Congress within 3 months after publication. The
librarian appointed to the Smithsonian, Charles Jewett, felt that the copyright
deposit had great importance for a national library: “To the public, the
importance, immediate and prospective, of having a central depot, here all the
products of the American press may be gathered, year by year, and preserved
for reference, is very great. The interest with which those who in 1950 may
consult this library would view a complete collection of all the works printed
in America in 1850, can only be fully and rightly estimated by the historian
and bibliographer, who has sought in vain for the productions of the past. . . .
Thus, in coming years, the collection would form a documentary history of
American letters, science, and art. It is greatly to be desired, however, that the
collection should be complete, without a single omission. We wish for every
book, every pamphlet, every printed or engraved production, however
apparently insignificant. Who can tell what may be important in future
centuries?”
Id. at 12 (quoting BD. OF REGENTS OF THE SMITHSONIAN INST., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTE, S. MISC. DOC. NO. 120 (1850)).
44. Spofford was appointed to the position on December 31, 1864, by President Abraham
Lincoln and held the position until July 1, 1897. See Ainsworth Rand Spofford (1825–1908), LIBR.
CONGRESS,
https://www.loc.gov/item/n90613873/ainsworth-rand-spofford-1825-1908/.
He
“served as the de facto Register of Copyrights until the position of Register was created in 1897.”
United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, supra note 24.
45. STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, supra note 39, at 13.
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political skill. . . . In his annual reports to Congress, Spofford
continually emphasized that a national library should be a
permanent, comprehensive collection of national literature
that represented “the complete product of the American mind
in every department of science and literature.”
Comprehensiveness was essential, for in his view the
American national library should serve both the American
citizenry and its elected representatives. Books and
information were needed about all subjects and, as the library
of the American government, the Library was the natural site
for such a comprehensive collection.46
Dement provides valuable insight into the larger context of these
efforts by Spofford to create a national library and, thus, of the second
purpose for mandatory deposits, writing that the rhetoric used to
promote the idea of a national library was part of a nationalistic effort
to establish the United States’ place in the educated, cultured world.47
She writes,
46. Ainsworth Rand Spofford (1825–1908), supra note 44 (citing AINSWORTH RAND
SPOFFORD: BOOKMAN AND LIBRARIAN (John Y. Cole ed., 1975)). Ellen C. Dement writes that
Spofford had a
vision of the Library of Congress as a national library which would help the
country gain intellectual and cultural preeminence in western culture. The
cornerstone of this project was the Copyright Law passed on July 8, 1870,
which centralized all copyright activities at the Library and required a copy
of every copyrighted work in the United States to be deposited there. By
passing this law, Spofford argued to Congress, the legislature would provide
a repository of American culture which would be “an invaluable aid to
thousands” because “the Public intelligence and welfare are promoted by
every extension of the means of acquiring knowledge.” The Copyright Law
consolidated the vast majority of material published in America into what
Spofford called “one truly great and comprehensive library, worthy of
Congress and the nation.”
Ellen C. Dement, The Making of a National Library, VAND. HIST. REV., Spring 2017, at 74, 74–
81.
47. Dement, supra note 46, at 74–81 (“This paper explores the transformation of the Library
of Congress from simply a legislative library into the national library of the United States. This
process occurred during Ainsworth Rand Spofford’s tenure as Librarian of Congress from 1864 to
1897, and he was instrumental in establishing the institution’s status as the national library. I argue
that Spofford’s key accomplishments, the Copyright Law of 1870 and the construction of a separate
Library of Congress building between 1886 and 1896, were inextricably linked with the broader
culture of late nineteenth century America. Without this cultural context, the Library would not
have become the national library of the United States. The paper begins with an overview of the
antebellum Library, which demonstrates its limited scope relative to the institution’s later
expansion while recognizing developments during the period that contributed to its national
character. I then move to a discussion of the Library under Spofford’s direction, examining the
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The late nineteenth century witnessed a desire to create a
uniquely American culture and edify the nation’s public on
that culture. This desire was reflected in the transformation
of the Library of Congress into America’s national library,
which functioned as a symbolic center of the nation’s
intellectual achievements. . . . [T]hrough the efforts of
Spofford and his contemporaries, the Library of Congress
became a truly national library that embodied the ideal of a
national culture, freely accessible to all Americans, and an
indispensable proponent of knowledge in the United States.48
Since registration of a publication is no longer required in order
to receive copyright protection, furnishing copies of works to the
Library of Congress is the only reason for maintaining the mandatorydeposit requirement. It is unclear precisely what this second purpose
is truly about. Is it about building the country’s intellectual and
cultural reputation—the early rhetoric mentioned above indicates as
much—or about meeting the needs of the Library of Congress? These
are entirely different propositions, but my position is that, in either
case, the reason is insufficient to justify the mandatory-deposit
requirement.
Regarding the former case (building the country’s intellectual and
cultural reputation), even if one accepts, as I do not, that, earlier in our
country’s history, building up a robust national library in order to
solidify our cultural standing in the world was sufficient justification
for requiring publishers to send copies of their works to the Library of
Congress, the times have changed enough that this justification is no
longer legitimate. The United States’ cultural place in the world is
rhetoric used to promote and disseminate the idea of a national library to Congress and the nation.
Next, I connect this rhetoric to the larger growth of public libraries in the United States, with both
the Library of Congress and municipal libraries presented as instruments to provide ‘culture’ to the
American public. These establishments propagated a unified and homogenous definition of
American culture ordained by an intellectual elite, who hoped that doing so would firmly establish
America as a western civilization. The final section of this paper analyzes the construction of a
separate Library of Congress building, which was used—particularly through its interior
decorations—as a pedagogical tool to further advance a westernized definition of American culture
by giving the American public ‘an insight into the colossal array of knowledge which the human
mind has accumulated and still gathers together.’ Thus, the transformation of the Library of
Congress into America’s national library was a direct manifestation of the ‘spirit of the age,’
coupling the nation’s nationalistic ambitions with its faith in the power of public institutions to
cultivate learning and culture.”).
48. Id. at 80.
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firmly entrenched, and publications are only a part of what makes the
country culturally important. As such, we need not endeavor to
establish ourselves as a center of education and culture via a
comprehensive, centralized national library, certainly not at the literal
expense of publishers. More fundamentally, a nation does not earn its
intellectual and cultural stature by maintaining a repository of
publications. Rather, it does so by its citizens’ producing those works
in the first place. The true value to the public is found in the content
of published works, not in their being collected.
As for the latter case (meeting the needs of the Library of
Congress), the mandatory-deposit requirement is not necessary to
achieve the goals of the Library of Congress. According to the Library
of Congress,
The primary function of the Library of Congress is to serve
the Congress. In addition, it provides service to government
agencies, other libraries, scholars, and the general public
through over twenty reading rooms and research centers. The
Library welcomes public use of its collections and reference
services, and endeavors to offer the widest possible use of
those collections consistent with their preservation and with
the Library’s obligation to serve the Congress and other
government agencies.49
Readily admitting that I certainly do not know all that is required by
Congress and the various federal agencies, I offer that their respective
functions and efforts would not be materially impeded were publishers
not required to furnish copies of their works to the Library of
Congress. Are Congress’s needs less served without copies of
Valancourt Books’ “rare, neglected, and out-of-print fiction, including
18th century gothic novels, Victorian horror novels, forgotten literary
fiction, and early LGBT fiction”?50 Are they less served without
copies of children books? Was Congress ill-served before the
imposition of the legal-deposit requirement? Is Congress materially
benefitted by the continual addition of works to a library that already

49. Using the Library’s Collections, LIBR. CONGRESS (last visited Feb. 23, 2020),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/useofcollections.html.
50. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 34, at 3.
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houses more than 140 million works?51 The main (and original)
purpose of the Library of Congress is to serve Congress, not to be a
warehouse of all of a country’s publications. More to the point, the
former can be accomplished without the latter. Simply, the mandatorydeposit requirement creates an obligation on publishers that is not
necessary to serve the chief purpose of the Library of Congress.
That said, even if a centralized local library is necessary for
Congress and federal agencies, I find dubious the “great value to the
public of supplying copies of public works to a national library.”52
Early proponents of establishing the Library of Congress as a national
library emphasized that such a library would provide a central location
for a comprehensive collection of publications.53 However, strictly in
terms of the time and money it would cost most Americans to visit the
Library of Congress, I fail to see a value to the public that would justify
the mandatory-deposit requirement’s burden on publishers. The public
is not owed free access to any commercial publication, much less the
vast majority of publications. Public libraries, which are scattered
throughout the country, are public privileges, not public rights. In
addition to free access to the vast amount of publications available at
public libraries—libraries that are more accessible and convenient for
almost all citizens than is the Library of Congress—the public has an
array of options for accessing various publications: purchasing from
bookstores; viewing via the Internet; borrowing from friends, family,
colleagues, or others; etc. As is the case with public libraries, these
options are also more accessible and convenient for most Americans
than is a visit to the Library of Congress. Even if one finds tremendous
value in having a copy of most publications on file at the Library of
Congress in Washington D.C., free to view, such value is overridden
51. See Using the Library’s Collections, supra note 49 (“The enormous size and variety of its
collections make the Library of Congress the largest library in the world. Comprised of
approximately 142 million items in virtually all formats, languages and subjects, these collections
are the single most comprehensive accumulation of human expression ever assembled.”); Research
and Reference Services: Frequently Asked Questions, LIBR. CONG., https://www.loc.gov/rr/resfaq.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2020) (“While virtually all subject areas are represented in the
collections, the Library does not attempt to collect comprehensively in the areas of clinical
medicine and technical agriculture, which are covered by the National Library of Medicine and the
National Agricultural Library, respectively. Researchers should also note that the Library of
Congress is distinct from the National Archives, which is the major repository for the official
records of the United States government.”).
52. See STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, supra note 39, at 34.
53. Id.
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by the burden imposed on the publisher. Publishers shouldn’t have to
pay for the free availability of their publications to the general public.
B. Unconstitutional
In her 1960 committee report, Elizabeth K. Dunne wrote, “If a
‘legal deposit’ system covering all domestic publications without
regard to copyright were desired, the consitutional [sic] basis for
requiring the deposit of works not under copyright would need to be
considered . . . .”54 Indeed, the constitutionality of the mandatorydeposit requirement needs to be considered. When it is, it fails on at
least three bases.
1. Fifth Amendment: Takings Clause
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”55
The requirements of 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) are a clear violation of
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which states private property cannot be taken for public
use without payment of just compensation to the property owner.56
The United States Supreme Court has long acknowledged that the
Takings Clause clearly covers physical appropriations of private
property for public use, stating in 1871 that the Takings Clause “has
always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation.”57
On several occasions, the United States Supreme Court has held that
54. Id. at 33.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
56. Id.
57. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1871); see also ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
97-112, TAKINGS DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY (2015) (“The
modern period, 1978 to the present, has seen the Court settle into a taxonomy of four fundamental
types of takings—total regulatory takings, partial regulatory takings, physical takings, and exaction
takings. The Court in this period also has sought to develop criteria for these four types, and to set
out ripeness standards and clarify the required remedy. In the preceding period, 1922 to 1978, the
Court first announced the regulatory taking concept—the notion that government regulation alone,
without appropriation or physical invasion of property, may be a taking if sufficiently severe.
During this time, however, it proffered little by way of regulatory takings criteria, continuing rather
its earlier focus on appropriations and physical occupations. In the earliest period of takings law,
1870 to 1922, the Court saw the Takings Clause as protecting property owners only from
appropriations and physical invasions, two forms of government interference with property seen
by the Court as most functionally similar to an outright condemnation of property. During this
infancy of takings law, regulatory restrictions were tested under other, non-takings theories, such
as whether they were within a state’s police power, and were generally upheld.”).
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the “classic taking” is one “in which the government directly
appropriates private property for its own use.”58 Such per se takings
require just compensation to be paid to the deprived property owner.59
This is precisely the case with section 407(a)’s mandatorydeposit requirement: it is a “classic taking,” as a book subject to the
mandatory-deposit requirement is personal property physically taken
by the government for public use, without compensation. And the
Takings Clause applies to personal property (such as books), not just
real property. In Horne v. Department of Agriculture,60 the Supreme
Court held,
The first question presented asks “Whether the
government’s ‘categorical duty’ under the Fifth Amendment
to pay just compensation when it ‘physically takes
possession of an interest in property,’ applies only to real
property and not to personal property.” The answer is no.
There is no dispute that the “classic taking [is one] in
which the government directly appropriates private property
for its own use.” Nor is there any dispute that, in the case of
real property, such an appropriation is a per se taking that
requires just compensation.
Nothing in the text or history of the Takings Clause, or
our precedents, suggests that the rule is any different when it
comes to appropriation of personal property. The
Government has a categorical duty to pay just compensation
when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home.
The Takings Clause provides: “[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

58. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324
(2002); see Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 (2015); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S.
498, 522 (1998).
59. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 321–22 (“The text of the Fifth
Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a distinction between physical takings and
regulatory takings. Its plain language requires the payment of compensation whenever the
government acquires private property for a public purpose, whether the acquisition is the result of
a condemnation proceeding or a physical appropriation. But the Constitution contains no
comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner from making certain uses of her
private property. Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings is as old as the
Republic and, for the most part, involves the straightforward application of per se rules.”).
60. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2425.
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It protects “private property” without any distinction
between different types.61
At issue in Horne was the United States Department of
Agriculture’s California Raisin Marketing Order (CRMO),62 which
required, “[A] percentage of a grower’s crop must be physically set
aside in certain years for the account of the Government, free of
charge. The Government then sells, allocates, or otherwise disposes of
the raisins in ways it determines are best suited to maintaining an
orderly market.”63 Raisin farmers Laura and Marvin Horne challenged
the law as a violation of the Takings Clause, and the Supreme Court
sided with them, holding, “The reserve requirement imposed by the
Raisin Committee is a clear physical taking. Actual raisins are

61. Id. at 2425–26 (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V and Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 324). In fact, protections against takings of personal property have a
longer history than do protections against takings of real property. See William Michael Treanor,
The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, GEO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y INST. PAPERS & REP.
2 (1998), https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi_papers/2/ (“In historical context, the
narrow scope of the Takings Clause is hardly surprising. The clause provided greater protection for
the property owner than the property owner had traditionally received. England’s Magna Carta did
not require compensation for government seizure of land. It only required compensation when the
government took personal property. Thus, crown officials were barred from ‘tak[ing] anyone’s
grain or other chattels, without immediately paying the money.’ Magna Carta, Art. 28. In contrast,
the sole limitation on government seizure of land was one of procedural regularity: ‘No free man
shall be dispossessed . . . except by the legal judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.’
Magna Carta, Art. 39. Early colonial charters were similarly limited in scope. Only the
Massachusetts Body of Liberty, adopted in 1641, required compensation when personal property
was taken. No colonial charter required compensation for the seizure of land. While property
owners, in practice, commonly were paid when their land was seized, no colony had a constitutional
obligation to do so, and, in fact, compensation was not always paid.”); see also James v. Campbell,
104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882) (“[A patent] confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the
patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without just
compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without compensation land which has been
patented to a private purchaser . . . .”).
62. 7 C.F.R. § 989 (2004); see also Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California; Order
Amending Marketing Order No. 989, 83 Fed. Reg. 53,965, 53,968 (Oct. 26, 2018) (to be codified
at 7 C.F.R. pt. 989).
63. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2424 (“The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 authorizes
the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate ‘marketing orders’ to help maintain stable markets for
particular agricultural products. The marketing order for raisins requires growers in certain years
to give a percentage of their crop to the Government, free of charge. The required allocation is
determined by the Raisin Administrative Committee, a Government entity composed largely of
growers and others in the raisin business appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. In 2002-2003,
this Committee ordered raisin growers to turn over 47 percent of their crop. In 2003-2004, 30
percent.”).
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transferred from the growers to the Government. Title to the raisins
passes to the Raisin Committee.”64
In the same way, per section 407(a), the government requires
deposits to the federal government of published works from privateproperty owners, so there is a clear physical taking, and title to the
works passes from their owners to the government. The Institute for
Justice writes, “The federal government can’t simply force someone
to turn over their personal property for the government’s own use
without paying them for it.”65 So, just compensation is required to be
paid to the deposits’ owners for the deposits. This means that the
government must use its own funds to pay for the books. The Supreme
Court has held that “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation
was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.”66 Thus, the mandatory-deposit
requirement’s financial burden properly belongs to the federal
government, not with those obligated by the requirement, such as
Valancourt. Quite simply, the government is forcing Valancourt to
deposit books that it otherwise would not, and Valancourt is paying to
do so, when the tab properly belongs with the government. As
Valancourt’s complaint states, “[i]f the government wishes to acquire
books, it should purchase them with funds raised through general
taxation.”67
The fact of section 407(a)’s unconstitutionality is amplified,
considering the raisin growers subject to the CRMO held a contingent
interest “in any net proceeds from sales the Raisin Committee makes,
after deductions for the export subsidies and the Committee’s
administrative expenses.”68 The Horne Court was not persuaded that
the contingent interest kept the requirement from constituting a taking,
writing,
The reserve requirement imposed by the Raisin
Committee is a clear physical taking. Actual raisins are
64. Id. at 2428.
65. Virginia Books Outdated Federal Law Threatens Unique Richmond Publisher, supra note
32.
66. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 40 (1960).
67. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 34, at 14.
68. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2424.
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transferred from the growers to the Government. Title to the
raisins passes to the Raisin Committee. The Committee’s
raisins must be physically segregated from free-tonnage
raisins. Reserve raisins are sometimes left on the premises of
handlers, but they are held “for the account” of the
Government. The Committee disposes of what become its
raisins as it wishes, to promote the purposes of the raisin
marketing order.
Raisin growers subject to the reserve requirement thus
lose the entire “bundle” of property rights in the appropriated
raisins—“the rights to possess, use and dispose of” them—
with the exception of the speculative hope that some residual
proceeds may be left when the Government is done with the
raisins and has deducted the expenses of implementing all
aspects of the marketing order. The Government’s “actual
taking of possession and control” of the reserve raisins gives
rise to a taking as clearly “as if the Government held full title
and ownership” as it essentially does.69
Likewise, publishers affected by section 407(a) lose their entire
bundle of property rights but, unlike the raisin growers subject to the
CRMO, do not retain any contingent interest. Thus, given that the
CRMO, which left affected property owners with at least some
remaining interest in the property, was held to violate the Takings
Clause, section 407(a) is an even more blatant violation, given that it
leaves affected property owners with zero interest in their property
taken. The Horne Court’s reference to the Supreme Court’s holding in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.70 that a physical
appropriation of private property “is perhaps the most serious form of
invasion of an owner’s property interests” because it deprives the
property owner of “the rights to possess, use and dispose of” said
property expresses the gravity of the deprivation of property caused
by section 407(a).71
69. Id. at 2428; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 330 n.25 (2002) (citations omitted) (explaining that under the Supreme Court’s
physical takings cases, “it would be irrelevant whether a property owner maintained 5% of the
value of the owner’s property, so long as there was a physical appropriation of any of the parcel”).
70. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
71. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 324 (discussing
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Forcing publishers, at their own expense, to submit copies of their
published works to the federal government, for use by the federal
government, is a per se taking—an actual, physical, and complete
taking of private property for public use that requires payment of just
compensation to said publishers. As such, unless and until such just
compensation is paid, application of the mandatory-deposit
requirement is quite clearly an unconstitutional taking.
2. First Amendment: Freedom of Speech
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.”72
Section 407(a) is clear violation of the First Amendment’s
mandate that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press,” for it restricts the speech freedoms of
publishers like Valancourt, by forcing them to speak more broadly
than they might wish to speak (and then pay for such unwanted
speech).73 Thus, the mandatory-deposit requirement compels speech.
Just as a publisher is free to publish a particular work, that publisher
is free not to publish that particular work. Valancourt, like all other
publishers, has a fundamental right to choose what to publish, but
section 407(a) forces Valancourt to publish works it otherwise would
not publish. In other words, publishers have the right to choose when
to speak, but section 407(a) forces them to speak.
The First Amendment protects one’s freedom of speech, meaning
both the freedom to speak and the freedom not to speak. In West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,74 the Supreme Court
held,
The right of freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed
by the Constitution against State action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at
the distinction between physical takings and regulatory takings: “Land-use regulations are
ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in some tangential way—often in completely
unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings would transform government regulation
into a luxury few governments could afford. By contrast, physical appropriations are relatively rare,
easily identified, and usually represent a greater affront to individual property rights.” (emphasis
added)).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
73. Id.
74. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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all, except insofar as essential operations of government may
require it for the preservation of an orderly society,—as in
the case of compulsion to give evidence in court.75
In his concurring opinion, Justice Murphy spoke of “the freedom of
the individual to be vocal or silent according to his conscience or
personal inclination.”76 In Wooley v. Maynard,77 the Supreme Court
held,
We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment against state
action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all. A system which secures the right
to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes
must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster
such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from
speaking are complementary components of the broader
concept of “individual freedom of mind.” This is illustrated
by the recent case of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), where we held
unconstitutional a Florida statute placing an affirmative duty
upon newspapers to publish the replies of political candidates
whom they had criticized. We concluded that such a
requirement deprived a newspaper of the fundamental right
to decide what to print or omit . . . .78
Individual freedom fundamentally includes the freedom not to
speak, not to express oneself—the freedom to be silent. This is true
not just for individuals but also the press. In Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo,79 the Supreme Court held,
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to
comply with a compulsory access law and would not be
forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the
inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the
barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into
the function of editors. A newspaper is more than a passive
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring).
Id. at 646.
430 U.S. 705 (1977).
Id. at 714 (citations omitted).
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising.
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the
decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of
the paper, and treatment of public issues and public
officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of
editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated
how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be
exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a
free press as they have evolved to this time.80
Anna M. Taruschio writes, “The Court based its decision on editorial,
not individual, autonomy, holding that the marketplace of ideas
interest held out by the state in its mandatory right of reply statute
could not defeat the newspaper’s editorial autonomy interest in
deciding what to print in its own pages.”81 Likewise, publishers are
free to decide what to print and what not to print, when to print and
when not to print. The First Amendment protects these rights.82 Of the
right not to speak, Taruschio writes that “a fundamental premise of
right not to speak doctrine” is “that compelled speech, by infringing
on an autonomy right, triggers First Amendment protection.”83
According to Taruschio, “the First Amendment always protects an
individual’s autonomy interest.”84
But, of course, First Amendment protections are not absolute. The
government can restrict fundamental freedoms, provided such
restrictions survive the requisite constitutional scrutiny. In general,
commercial speech85 is subject to intermediate constitutional scrutiny,
80. Id. at 258.
81. Anna M. Taruschio, The First Amendment, the Right Not to Speak and the Problem of
Government Access Statutes, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001, 1015 (2000).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
83. Taruschio, supra note 81, at 1036.
84. Id. at 1037. Taruschio writes of
the dual nature of the protection that the right not to speak affords: first, the
right to disassociate oneself from speech with which one disagrees, and
second, the right to control over the right to speak or not to speak at all. Thus,
the right not to speak comprises both the autonomy right to resist compelled
speech and also the absolute right to remain silent unless and until one chooses
to break that silence.
Id. at 1039. She states that “the autonomy promised by the Bill of Rights and repeatedly affirmed
by Supreme Court jurisprudence protects the right not to speak.” Id. at 1051.
85. Commercial speech is speech “related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
its audience.” See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). It
is speech that proposes a “commercial transaction.” Id. at 562.
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meaning any law restricting commercial speech must advance a
substantial government interest and must not be any broader than is
necessary to advance such interest.86 But reviewing the mandatorydeposit requirement under intermediate scrutiny is problematic for at
least two reasons.
Firstly, the speech compelled by the mandatory-deposit
requirement is not commercial in nature. Forcing publishers to deposit
to the Library of Congress copies of their works is not within the realm
of commercial speech. Publishers are not depositing works for
financial gain. They are not choosing to participate in commerce. This
is not advertising. Rather, the speech involved here is speaking,
generally. It is the fundamental freedom not to speak at all,
commercially or otherwise. Such speech merits higher scrutiny than
that afforded commercial speech.
Secondly, the mandatory-deposit requirement does not restrict
speech but, rather, compels it; so a standard for reviewing laws
restricting speech would not seem to apply to a law compelling
speech. However, one can view forcing someone to speak as a
restriction on speech, because it restricts that person’s freedom not to
speak. Viewed as such, all that would remain would be the first issue:
the speech is not commercial in nature. That said, one could make the
argument that publishers publish for financial gain—that they publish
copies that are for sale—and that this makes the speech commercial in
nature. This argument would likely advance the notion that though the
specific copies affected by the mandatory-deposit requirement are not
part of any commercial market, commerce is the reason for the original
publishing of those works. If this argument prevails, then the correct
standard of constitutional review for the mandatory-deposit
requirement is intermediate scrutiny.
On the other hand, if one rejects the argument that the speech
mandated by the mandatory-deposit requirement is commercial
speech, then the appropriate level of constitutional review for the
86. Id. at 566 (“In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.”).
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mandatory-deposit requirement should be the highest level—strict
scrutiny—because section 407(a) compels speech. According to the
Supreme Court, “[m]andating speech that a speaker would not
otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.”87 So, the
mandatory-deposit requirement is a content-based regulation of
speech, since it mandates speech that publishers would not otherwise
necessarily make. The Supreme Court has written,
The Government may, however, regulate the content of
constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interest. . . . The Government may
serve this legitimate interest, but to withstand constitutional
scrutiny, “it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations
designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily
interfering with First Amendment freedoms.” It is not
enough to show that the Government’s ends are compelling;
the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.88
Thus, for a law to survive strict scrutiny, that law must be narrowly
tailored to a compelling state interest and must be the least-restrictive
means of achieving that interest. So, which standard of constitutional
review should apply: intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny? Or
perhaps a standard that lies between those two?
The type of speech compelled by the mandatory-deposit
requirement is not the type of compelled speech that forces someone
to profess a belief or speak an opinion with which she disagrees. If it
were, strict scrutiny would certainly apply.89 This is also not a
87. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 781 (1988). The Supreme Court continued,
“We therefore consider the Act as a content-based regulation of speech. See Miami Herald Publ’g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 256 (1974) (statute compelling newspaper to print an editorial reply
“exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper”).” Id. at 795.
88. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
(citations omitted) (quoting Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980)).
89. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 220–21 (2013)
(“But the Policy Requirement goes beyond preventing recipients from using private funds in a way
that would undermine the federal program. It requires them to pledge allegiance to the
Government’s policy of eradicating prostitution. As to that, we cannot improve upon what Justice
Jackson wrote for the Court 70 years ago: ‘If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein.’ Barnette, 319 U.S., at 642. The Policy Requirement compels as a condition of federal
funding the affirmation of a belief that by its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the
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compelled commercial disclosure, in which the government requires a
seller of goods or services to include certain messages in
advertisements, meant to inform the public about the goods or
services. If it were, rational-basis scrutiny would certainly apply.90
Rather, the mandatory-disclosure requirement is simply a requirement
that a publisher produce and submit to the federal government extra
copies of a published work (i.e., non-commercial speech). The
message contained therein is the choice of the speaker’s, but the
decision to express that message via the mandated copy disclosure is
not.

Government program. In so doing, it violates the First Amendment and cannot be sustained.”);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (“We are thus faced with the question of whether
the State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an
ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose
that it be observed and read by the public. We hold that the State may not do so.”); W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein.”).
90. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 650–
51 (1985) (“We have, to be sure, held that in some instances compulsion to speak may be as
violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions on speech. See, e. g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Indeed, in W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court went so far as to state that
‘involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds
than silence.’ Id. at 633. But the interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those
discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette. Ohio has not attempted to ‘prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein.’ Id. at 642. The State has attempted only to prescribe what shall
be orthodox in commercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement
that appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about the
terms under which his services will be available. Because the extension of First Amendment
protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the
information such speech provides, see Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976), appellant’s constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular
factual information in his advertising is minimal. Thus, in virtually all our commercial speech
decisions to date, we have emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench much more
narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, ‘[warnings] or
[disclaimers] might be appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer
confusion or deception.’ In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982). Accord, Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 565; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); Va. Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 772,
n.24. We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate the advertiser’s First
Amendment rights at all. We recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure
requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech. But we
hold that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”).
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Since non-commercial speech is more protected than is
commercial speech91 and since a restriction on commercial speech is
generally subject to intermediate scrutiny (though, as stated above,
compelled commercial disclosures are subject to rational-basis review,
and though some commercial-speech restrictions have been subjected
to heightened scrutiny92), it stands to reason that the mandatorydisclosure requirement, which forces non-commercial speech, would,
at a minimum, be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny. And, at most,
it is akin to the forced-profession/opinion variety that would be judged
under strict scrutiny.
For purposes of this Article, I give the benefit of the doubt (about
where the speech mandated by the mandated-disclosure requirement
falls on the speech continuum) to the government and accept that the
speech affected by the mandatory-deposit requirement is more
protected than compelled commercial disclosures but less protected
than being compelled to profess a certain belief. In such case,
intermediate scrutiny would apply; and my contention is that when
reviewed under intermediate scrutiny, the justifications for the
mandatory-deposit requirement are insufficient to outweigh its
injuries to publishers. As such, the mandatory-deposit requirement
would also not survive any level of review more stringent than
91. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980)
(“Nevertheless, our decisions have recognized ‘the “commonsense” distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government
regulation, and other varieties of speech.’ The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.” (citations omitted)).
92. See Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 &
n.24 (1976) (“In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we have
not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are commonsense differences
between speech that does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction,’ and other varieties.
Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus
subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of
protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is
unimpaired. The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by its
disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the
advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself
provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may be
more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is
little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.” (citation omitted));
see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566–67 (2011) (“The State argues that heightened
judicial scrutiny is unwarranted because its law is a mere commercial regulation. It is true that
restrictions on protected expression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity or, more
generally, on nonexpressive conduct.”).
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intermediate scrutiny, including strict scrutiny. Thus, regardless of
which level of review that could legitimately be applied to it, the
mandatory-deposit requirement should not survive constitutional
scrutiny and should, therefore, be invalidated.
To survive intermediate scrutiny, the government must show93
that the mandatory-deposit requirement (1) directly advances a
substantial government interest; and (2) that is no more extensive than
necessary to advance that interest.94 At best, the mandatory-deposit
requirement meets the first requirement but not the second
requirement. At worst, it meets neither.
a. First requirement
Though I believe the mandatory-deposit requirement does not
advance a substantial government interest,95 I will concede on this
element, for the case against me on this element is far more legitimate
than is the case against me for the second element. And I believe that,
without a doubt, the second element is not met, so conceding the first
element is not fatal to my position, since both elements are required,
in order to pass the requisite constitutional scrutiny.
So, for purposes of concession, the mandatory-deposit
requirement directly advances the government’s interest in supplying
copies of publications to the Library of Congress. As previously noted,
the first purpose of the mandatory-deposit requirement “to identify the
copyrighted work in connection with copyright registration”96 is no
longer applicable and is, thus, not a substantial government interest.
Ainsworth Spofford’s goal of creating a comprehensive, national
93. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (“The State must assert a substantial interest to be
achieved by restrictions on commercial speech.”).
94. Id. at 566 (“In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.”).
95. See generally Part IV, Section A (It is unclear precisely what this second purpose is truly
about. Is it about building the country’s intellectual and cultural reputation—the early rhetoric
mentioned above indicates as much—or about meeting the needs of the Library of Congress? These
are entirely different propositions, but my position is that, in either case, the reason is insufficient
to justify the mandatory-deposit requirement.).
96. STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, supra note 39.
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library to serve the needs of Congress and the public is worthwhile,
directly relating to educating our nation’s leaders and citizenry and to
establishing and maintaining our intellectual and cultural standing in
the world. Surely, this is a substantial interest directly advanced by the
mandatory-deposit requirement.
b. Second requirement
Accepting that the mandatory-deposit requirement directly
advances a substantial government interest, it is certainly more
extensive than necessary to advance that interest. So, even if the first
requirement of intermediate scrutiny is satisfied, the second is not, as
there are other means to advance the government’s interest that impose
less of a burden on publishers than does the mandatory-deposit
requirement.
Plainly, if the federal government’s acquiring copies of published
works serves to advance a substantial government interest, there are
ways to acquire such copies other than by requiring publishers to
furnish, on their own dime, copies of their publications to the
government. On this point, Valancourt’s complaint states,
There is no government interest served by the deposit
requirement that could not be served equally well by less
restrictive means such as the government purchasing the
works it desires or by relying on the many avenues (like the
cataloging-in-publication program or the deposit
requirement for publishers who wish to register their
copyrights) by which the government can acquire works
voluntarily.97
Each of the three options mentioned in the complaint would be less
burdensome on Valancourt and other publishers than is the
mandatory-deposit requirement.
Firstly, and obviously, if the federal government purchases
publications, then the burden on publishers is drastically diminished.
Thus, the mandatory-deposit requirement, which forces publishers to
bear the costs of furnishing works to the federal government, is more
extensive than necessary to advance any substantial government
interest in obtaining copies of published works. Granted, publishers
97. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 34, at 15.
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would still bear the burden of using their time and effort to submit the
required deposits, but this burden is much less than the burden of time,
effort, and expense.
Secondly, publishers can freely choose to submit to the Library
of Congress copies of their publications, as required by the Library of
Congress’s Cataloging in Publication Program,98 which offers
publishers certain benefits. According to the Library of Congress,
[a] Cataloging in Publication record (aka CIP data) is a
bibliographic record prepared by the Library of Congress for
a book that has not yet been published. When the book is
published, the publisher includes the CIP data on the copyright
page thereby facilitating book processing for libraries and
book dealers.99
Publishers like Valancourt are not forced to take part in the program
but are free to do so, so the program is less burdensome on publishers
than is the mandatory-deposit requirement. And every copy submitted
to the Library of Congress for purposes of the program is another copy
that helps advance any substantial government interest in obtaining
copies of published works. Admittedly, the optional program
presumably would not yield as many copies as the mandatory-deposit
requirement, but it would still advance any substantial government
interest in obtaining copies of published works. That it would not
advance it as much as a mandatory program does not nullify its ability

98. About CIP, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/publish/cip/about/index.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2020).
There is no charge for CIP processing. However, participating publishers are
obligated to send a complimentary copy of all books for which CIP data was
provided immediately upon publication. Publishers failing to meet this
obligation may be suspended from the program. Please note that all books
submitted to the Library of Congress in compliance with the CIP Program are
property of the Library of Congress.
Frequently Asked Questions, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/publish/cip/faqs/ (last visited
Feb. 23, 2020). Note:
There is no relationship between the CIP Program and Copyright. The main
purpose of copyright records is to document the intellectual or creative
ownership of a work. The main purpose of a CIP record is to record the
bibliographic data elements of a work and facilitate access to it in library
catalogs. Separate deposits are required to fulfill either mandatory deposit
(Section 407) or copyright registration (Section 408) of US Copyright Law.
Id.
99. Cataloging in Publication Program, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/publish/cip/
(last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
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to satisfy the second requirement of intermediate scrutiny. Since the
mandatory-deposit requirement is, well, mandatory, it is more
restrictive to the freedom of publishers than is the optional Cataloging
in Publication Program. Thus, it is more extensive than necessary to
advance any substantial government interest in obtaining copies of
published works.
Finally, section 408 of the Copyright Act requires a copy of any
work for which copyright registration is filed.100 This certainly
advances any substantial government interest in obtaining copies of
published works. And like the Cataloging in Publication Program,
copyright registration is optional, so it doesn’t force publishers to
submit to the federal government copies of their works. Thus, the
copyright-deposit requirement is less burdensome to publishers than
is the mandatory-deposit requirement, which is, as a result, more
extensive than necessary to advance any substantial government
interest in obtaining copies of published works.
What binds each of these and, thus, what makes each less
burdensome to publishers than the mandatory-deposit requirement is
that a publisher either freely chooses to furnish a copy of a publication
to the federal government or is forced to do so but is paid just
compensation for doing so. By contrast, the mandatory-deposit
requirement forces publishers to submit copies of their works yet does
not pay them for doing so; instead, the publishers bear the expenses.
In summary, section 407(a) violates the First Amendment’s
requirement that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press,”101 because it forces publishers like
Valancourt to speak, when the First Amendment’s guarantee of
freedom of speech includes the freedom not to speak. Thus, the
mandatory-deposit requirement compels speech and does so without
sufficient justification, at least without one strong enough to survive
intermediate constitutional scrutiny. As such, section 407(a) is
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.

100. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2005).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

(8) 53.3_THORNLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

7/7/2020 10:52 PM

678

[Vol. 53:645

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

3. Fifth Amendment: Equal Protection via the Due Process Clause
“No person . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”102
Another possible objection to the mandatory-deposit requirement
is that it violates the equal-protection guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, as it does not treat all publishers
equally, exempting certain published works from the requirement.103
37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c) lists twelve categories of works that are exempt
from the mandatory-deposit requirement.104 Thus, the mandatorydeposit requirement forces some publishers, but not others, to deposit
works, depending on the type of publication.
For example, unlike most physical books, e-books are exempt
from section 407(a).105 In addition, many types of physical
publications are not subject to the mandate. Among others; “Greeting
cards, picture postcards, and stationery”; “Lectures, sermons,
speeches, and addresses when published individually and not as a
collection of the works of one or more authors”; “Prints, labels, and
other advertising matter, including catalogs, published in connection
with the rental lease, lending, licensing, or sale of articles of
102.
103.
104.
105.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See 17 U.S.C. § 407(c).
37 C.F.R. § 202.19 (2018).
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 7D: MANDATORY DEPOSIT OF COPIES OR
PHONORECORDS FOR THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ07d.pdf
(last updated Mar. 2019) (“As noted elsewhere in this circular, the mandatory deposit requirement
applies only to works published in the United States. Accordingly, unpublished works and works
that are published solely outside the United States are not subject to this requirement. Most works
that are published only online are not subject to mandatory deposit. Under Copyright Office
regulations, the following categories of published works are also exempt from mandatory deposit
because they are not selected for addition to the Library of Congress collections or for use in
national library programs. NOTE: A work exempt from mandatory deposit is not exempt from the
deposit requirements for copyright registration. • Tests and answer material published separately
from other works; • Individually published speeches, sermons, lectures, and addresses; • Works
originally published as part of a collective work (although the collective work itself may be subject
to mandatory deposit); • Literary, dramatic, and musical works published only in phonorecords
(although the recording itself may be subject to mandatory deposit from the copyright owner or
publisher of the sound recording); • Motion picture soundtracks (although the motion picture itself
may be subject to mandatory deposit); • Motion pictures published solely through a license or grant
to a nonprofit institution to make a fixation of that program directly from a transmission to the
public; • Scientific or technical diagrams, models, plans, or designs; • Advertising materials,
including catalogs; • Three-dimensional sculptural works; • Jewelry; • Dolls, toys, and games; •
Plaques; • Floor coverings, wallpaper and similar commercial wall coverings, textiles and other
fabrics; • Packaging materials; • Useful articles; and • Online-only electronic works, with the
exception of electronic serials that have been demanded by the Copyright Office”).
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merchandise, works of authorship, or services”; “Works first
published as individual contributions to collective works”; and
“Works first published outside the United States and later published
in the United States without change in copyrightable content” are
exempt from the mandatory-deposit requirements of section 407(a).106
Therefore, the statute does not treat all publishers the same, based on
the medium or content of their publications. It forces some speech but
not other speech. Such disparate treatment by the federal government
clearly triggers equal-protection analysis.
That said, an argument can be made that attacking the mandatorydeposit requirement on equal-protection grounds might be
unnecessary, given that the free-speech protections of the First
Amendment provide a sufficient basis for arguing for the
unconstitutionality of the requirement. In his article Basic Equal
Protection Analysis,107 Russell W. Galloway, Jr. writes,
In recent years, the Court has suggested that the
fundamental rights strand of equal protection theory may be
redundant and slated for cancellation. If government action
infringes the claimant’s fundamental right, strict scrutiny
should be applicable on that basis alone without reference to
the equal protection clause. For example, a content-based
infringement of free speech rights of labor unions triggers
strict scrutiny under the first amendment itself, so the equal
protection clause is not needed. Similarly, selective
interference with the right of privacy can be curtailed under
the due process clauses without help from equal protection
theory.108
Thus, it is possible that using the First Amendment to argue against
the mandatory-deposit requirement, as explored above, is enough. But
if only to attempt to solidify the case against the legality of the
106. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c)(2), (3), (7), (9), (10) (2018). “Works first published outside the
United States and later published in the United States without change in copyrightable content” are
exempt from the mandatory-deposit requirements of § 407(a) only if only if “[r]egistration for the
work was made under 17 U.S.C. 408 before the work was published in the United States; or (ii)
[r]egistration for the work was made under 17 U.S.C. 408 after the work was published in the
United States but before a demand for deposit is made under 17 U.S.C. 407(d).” Id. §
202.19(c)(10)(i)–(ii).
107. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 121
(1989).
108. Id. at 150 (footnotes omitted).
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requirement, I will assume the Equal Protection Clause is not
redundant; and I will, thus, explore the requirement from an equalprotection perspective.
Under traditional First Amendment free-speech analysis, for
content-neutral speech rules (e.g., exemptions based on medium of
publication), intermediate scrutiny applies.109 For content-based
speech rules (e.g., exemptions based on subject matter of publication),
strict scrutiny applies.110 But as explored in the section above, under
either intermediate or strict scrutiny, section 407(a) does not survive
constitutional scrutiny, under traditional free-speech-restriction
analysis.
But this third possible objection is not based on the First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech but rather on the Fifth’s
guarantee of equal protection under the law. Here, section 407(a) does
not impact all forms of speech to the same degree. On the contrary,
some speech is forced, while some is unaffected. All published works
are not treated equally by the federal government; and when the
federal government fails to protect everyone equally under the law, its
actions are judged with the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.
Here, the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny should be
strict scrutiny, the highest level of scrutiny, which applies when a

109. R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A
Distinction That Is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2084 (2016) (“In contrast to
the most typical approaches to speech restrictions categorized as content-based, content-neutral
regulations commonly receive less exacting, less demanding, mid-level judicial scrutiny. There are
certainly variations among the content-neutral test formulations, but the most broadly applied
formulations seem to require a significant or substantial government interest.” (quoting Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) and Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (citing McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014)).
110. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 118 (1991) (“The Son of Sam law establishes a financial disincentive to create or publish
works with a particular content. In order to justify such differential treatment, ‘the State must show
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end.’” (quoting Arkansas Writers’ Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987))); see also
Wright, supra note 109, at 2083 (“To illustrate the basic problem through the most recent case law,
it is helpful to begin with a brief reminder of the differences in the judicial tests applied to
regulations of speech, which are contingent upon the initial classification as content-neutral or
content-based. Once a court has made the initial classification, content-based regulations of speech
are generally subjected to a particularly rigorous and exacting degree of judicial scrutiny.
Traditionally, this strict scrutiny encompasses two requirements. Specifically, the speech regulation
in such a case must promote a compelling or overridingly important government interest, and the
regulation must be necessary to the narrowly tailored promotion of that interest.” (footnotes
omitted)).
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fundamental right is affected;111 the mandatory-deposit requirement
impacts free speech, a fundamental right guaranteed by the First
Amendment.112 To survive strict scrutiny, a law must serve a
compelling government interest and be necessary to promote that
interest. In addition, the law must be narrowly tailored, and there must
be no less restrictive means available to promote that interest.113 As is
111. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”
(citations omitted)).
112. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (citing
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)) (stating that free speech is entitled to “comprehensive
protection under the first amendment.”).
113. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973) (“In subjecting to
strict judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational residency
requirement as a precondition to receiving AFDC benefits, the Court explained: ‘(I)n moving from
State to State . . . appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which
serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest, is unconstitutional.’”); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (“At
the outset, we reject appellants’ argument that a mere showing of a rational relationship between
the waiting period and these four admittedly permissible state objectives will suffice to justify the
classification. The waiting-period provision denies welfare benefits to otherwise eligible applicants
solely because they have recently moved into the jurisdiction. But in moving from State to State or
to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.” (citations omitted)); see also Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (“But if it was not clear then, it is certainly clear now that a
more exacting test is required for any statute that ‘place[s] a condition on the exercise of the right
to vote.’ This development in the law culminated in Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra.
There we canvassed in detail the reasons for strict review of statutes distributing the franchise,
noting inter alia that such statutes ‘constitute the foundation of our representative society.’ We
concluded that if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the
franchise to others, ‘the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a
compelling state interest.’ This is the test we apply here.” (citations omitted)); id. at 338–39
(“Although in Shapiro we specifically did not decide whether durational residence requirements
could be used to determine voting eligibility, we concluded that since the right to travel was a
constitutionally protected right, ‘any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional.’” (citations omitted)); id. at 342 (“In sum, durational residence laws must be
measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate
that such laws are ‘necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.’” (first emphasis
added) (citations omitted)); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626–27 (1969)
(“‘In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider
the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting,
and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.’ And, in this case, we must
give the statute a close and exacting examination. ‘Since the right to exercise the franchise in a free
and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.’ This
careful examination is necessary because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the
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true when intermediate scrutiny applies, when strict scrutiny applies,
the burden is on the government to overcome a presumption of
unconstitutionality.114
Publishers are not treated equally under the law when they are
forced to speak, while certain others are not. The disparate treatment—
the unequal protection under the law—of publishers is clear. What is
left to decide is whether such unequal protection is constitutionally
permissible, under strict-scrutiny review. It is not.
Even if it is found that the government’s interest in acquiring
public works for use in a national library is compelling (I do not
believe it is115) and that the mandatory-deposit requirement is
necessary to promote that interest (I do not believe it is), it is certainly
not the case that the mandatory-deposit requirement is narrowly
tailored to promote that interest, or that there are no less restrictive
means for promoting that interest. Clearly, there are other ways to
achieve the government’s objective, most notably the government’s
paying just compensation to publishers for any and all published
works the government desires. Additionally, the legislature could
change federal copyright law to make deposits a requirement of
copyright protection. Also, the Library of Congress’s voluntary
Cataloging in Publication Program, discussed above, could be the
primary way the government acquires copies of published works. Each
of these means is less intrusive than a requirement that, unrelated to
copyright protection, forces a publisher to submit and pay for copies
of published works.
In sum, strict scrutiny is the appropriate test to apply to the
mandatory-deposit requirement, which forces certain publishers to
foundation of our representative society. Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may
participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of
representative government. Thus, state apportionment statutes, which may dilute the effectiveness
of some citizens’ votes, receive close scrutiny from this Court. No less rigid an examination is
applicable to statutes denying the franchise to citizens who are otherwise qualified by residence and
age. Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of
denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect
their lives. Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents
of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.” (citations omitted)).
114. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980) (“The burden, however,
is on those defending the discrimination to make out the claimed justification . . . .”).
115. See Wright, supra note 109, at 2099 (“Formalistically, a compelling interest is described
as ‘of the highest order,’ ‘overriding,’ or ‘paramount.’” (footnotes omitted)).
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speak, based on the content and/or medium of their publication; and
the mandatory-deposit requirement does not survive strict scrutiny.
But even if intermediate scrutiny (law must advance a substantial
government interest and must not be any broader than is necessary to
advance such interest) applies to the mandatory-deposit requirement,
the requirement still does not survive, since it is broader than
necessary to advance the government’s interest, given that there exist
other less-intrusive means to advance said interest.116
V. CONCLUSION
The mandatory-deposit requirement of section 407(a) of the
Copyright Act of 1976 is unconstitutional. It takes private property
from publishers for public use, without the payment of just
compensation to the publishers, in violation of the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, by forcing publishers to speak,
mandatory-deposit requirement impermissibly restricts the freespeech rights of publishers, which include the right not to speak, as
guaranteed by the First Amendment. Finally, by forcing certain
publications to be deposited, while others are exempted (based on the
content and/or medium of publication), the mandatory-deposit
requirement does not give publishers equal protection under the law,
as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
As such, my recommendation is to repeal section 407(a). In its
absence, should the federal government decide to pursue its goal of
collecting copies of published works for public use at the Library of
Congress (or elsewhere), several options are available to the federal
government to advance its goal, each of which is less burdensome to
publishers than section 407(a).

116. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Under this four-part test a restraint on commercial ‘communication
[that] is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity’ is subject to an intermediate level of
scrutiny, and suppression is permitted whenever it ‘directly advances’ a ‘substantial’ governmental
interest and is “not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”).
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